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The Constitutional Admissibility of Confessions 
Induced by Appeals to Religious Belief 
Richard E. Durfee, Jr.* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Picture this scenario: The police have a suspect to a heinous crime 
in custody. During questioning of the suspect, the police appeal to the 
suspect's religious beliefs in order to obtain a confession. The particular 
religious beliefs of the suspect may vary significantly to include: the 
need for a confession to obtain personal salvation; the need to somehow 
benefit the victim of the crime (e.g., Christian burial); a commitment to 
arrive at nirvana through respect for the life force of all sentient beings; 
a sense of social morality, divine justice, or of ultimate responsibility; a 
fear of hellfire and damnation; or some other belief or value. The na-
ture of the police appeal to the suspect's religious beliefs may also be 
many things: exhorting with words alone, reading or reciting from the 
Bible or other scripture, conducting the interrogation in a chapel or 
church, interrogating with the help or in the presence of a religious 
leader, adorning the interrogation room with religious symbols or icons, 
representing either truthfully or falsely to have religious authority to 
absolve sin upon confession, etc. The police officers themselves may or 
may not share the suspect's religious beliefs and may even falsely re-
present their own religious convictions to the suspect. 
Imagine further that the suspect indeed confesses. To keep it sim-
ple, assume that there are no other factors that might taint the confes-
sion. The arrest was legal; the suspect was not mentally or physically 
incapacitated; there was no other form of trickery or deception; no im-
proper promises were made or implied; there was no physical violence 
or intimidation; the suspect was advised of her rights and exercised 
them as she saw fit. Is the confession constitutionally admissible as 
evidence? 
There are at least two hurdles which such a confession must over-
come in order to pass constitutional muster. First, the confession must 
qualify as admissible under the doctrine of constitutional "voluntari-
* Sole Practitioner, Mesa, Arizona; B.A. 1983, M.A. 1988, J.D. 1989, Arizona State 
University. 
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ness." 1 Second, the state's use of religious belief must satisfy potential 
first amendment and other constitutional barriers to the exploitation of 
religion for secular/ state purposes. 2 
The use of religion or the religious beliefs of an accused by police 
during custodial interrogation has been examined under a variety of 
doctrines including the sixth amendment right to counsel,3 fifth amend-
ment right to silence,4 fifth and fourteenth amendment due process/ 
totality of circumstances,11 and the constitutional right to privacy.6 Al-
though results have gone both ways,7 the common thread running 
through most of these doctrines is "voluntariness." 
The thesis of this article is that under the voluntariness standard, 
confessions induced by appeal to religious belief alone are voluntary 
and admissible. There are a small number of cases in which confessions 
induced in part by appeals to the suspect's religious beliefs were found 
to be involuntary. These cases can be distinguished, however, on both 
factual and doctrinal grounds. 
Courts have not fully developed the first amendment and privacy 
doctrines in this area. Nevertheless, these doctrines do raise questions 
about the proper relationship between religion and the state, particu-
larly in terms of state exploitation of religion to induce confessions. At 
a minimum, these doctrines merit perfunctory consideration, if not in-
depth analysis, to guard against infringement of the fundamental liber-
ties protected by the Constitution. 
II. CoNSTITUTIONAL VoLUNTARINEss 
A. Establishing a Voluntariness Standard for Confessions 
1. Common law and the fifth amendment 
The United States Supreme Court long ago established the rule 
that the Constitution requires a confession to be made voluntarily or it 
I. Srr infra section 11-A. 
2. Srr infra section III. A related issue is whether certain otherwise criminal behavior is 
constitutionally protected as the free exercise of religious belief. It rarely is. Sn, f.{;., Reynolds v. 
United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1878) (religious belief defense to the practice of polygamy rejected); 
Walker v. Superior Court, 47 Cal. 3d 112, 763 P.2d 852, 253 Cal. Rptr. 1 ( 1988) (prosecution of 
Christian Scientist parent who treated child's illness with prayer rather than medical care, thus 
resulting in death of child). 
3. Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) ("Christian burial speech"). 
4. United States v. Boyce, 594 F.2d 1246 (9th Cir. 1979). 
5. Srr, r.g., Welch v. Butler, 835 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1988); Stawicki v. Israel, 778 F.2d 380 
(7th Cir. 1985); Gessner v. United States, 354 F.2d 726 (lOth Cir. 1965) (interrogation of men-
tally ill suspect by chaplain). 
6. Srr Ramie v. City of Hedwig Village, 765 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1985). 
7. Srr infra section II-B. 
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will be inadmissable. 8 The Court first articulated "voluntariness" as an 
actual test for confessions in 1884 in Hopt v. Utah. 9 Rather than focus-
ing on police tactics, which is generally the policy concern today, the 
Court initially appropriated the English common law rationale that 
voluntary confessions are trustworthy and reliable. In fact, the Court 
regarded voluntarily-made confessions as "among the most effectual 
proofs in the law."10 Although the Court was aware of the need to 
protect individuals from coerced confessions/1 the original aim of the 
rule excluding an involuntary confession from evidence was primarily 
to exclude false evidence, not to protect the rights of the accused. 12 
The Court first considered police conduct and the fifth amendment 
privilege against self-incrimination in 1897 in Bram v. United States. 13 
The Court concluded that the Constitution's privilege against self-in-
crimination went no further than to codify the common law doctrine of 
voluntariness in order to avoid false confessions. 14 This view has been 
vigorously criticized.15 Nevertheless, Bram opened the door for the 
Court to expand the voluntariness test nearly three decades later to in-
clude express consideration of "the circumstances of the interroga-
tion."16 This eventually led to the adoption of a due process/fundamen-
tal fairness approach. 17 However, throughout this early period, even 
though police conduct and the fifth amendment privilege were factors to 
be considered, the basic doctrine underlying the voluntariness test re-
mained the essential unreliability of coerced confessions. 
8. Bram v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886); 
Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884). 
9. 110 US 574 (1884) "Voluntariness" was mentioned and at least indirectly considered by 
the Supreme Court 92 years earlier in Commonwealth v. Dillon, 4 U.S. 116 (1792). In this case, 
the court was concerned with the influence of certain threats and inducements made to a twelve 
year-old arson suspect who eventually confessed. However, the ultimate test was not why the 
confession was given or how the confession was obtained, but the reliability of the confession, i.e., 
whether the threats and inducements rendered the confession untrue. 
10. Hoj1t, 110 U.S. at 585. 
11. "We are unwilling to subject those suspected of crime to the 'cruel trilemma' of self-
accusation, perjury or contempt." Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591, 637 (1896) (Field, J., 
dissenting). 
12. Srr Lisenba v. California, 314 U.S. 219 (1941) rrh'r; dmird, 315 U.S. 826 (1942). 
13. 168 U.S. 532 (1897) (confession obtained through coercive interrogation by police of for-
eign state not admissible). 
14. Srr id. 
15. Srr, r.r;., Ogletree, Arr Confrssions Rmlly Good for thr Soul?: A Proposal to Mirandiu 
Miranda, 100 HARV. L. R.:v. 1826, 1831 n.23 (1987) and accompanying text [hereinafter cited 
as Ogletree]. 
16. Ziang Sung Wan v. United States, 266 U.S. 1 (1924). 
17. Srr mjra notes 18-22 and accompanying text. 
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2. Due process 
Not until 1936, in Brown ·v. Mississippi, 18 did the Court introduce 
a due process approach, based on the fifth and fourteenth amendments. 
Under this new approach, the Court expressly considered the fairness 
of how the confession was obtained rather than merely its reliability. 19 
The Court still retained the voluntariness standard, however, and in 
scores of cases that followed Brown, the Court's case-by-case analysis 
alternated between the voluntariness/reliability approach and the due 
process/fairness approach. 20 The result was a somewhat imprecise 
blend of reliability of confessions, voluntariness, and due process analy-
sis.21 This often led to confusion and uncertainty, particularly for law 
enforcement officials trying to determine what was acceptable and for 
lower courts attempting to provide guidance. 22 
3. Sixth amendment right to counsel 
During the 1960s, the admissibility of confessions came under at-
tack from another quarter-the sixth amendment right to counsel. 23 
When examining the admissibility of confessions, the Court began to 
consider additional policy concerns such as the protection of the inno-
cent from conviction as a result of poor performance on the witness 
18. 297 U.S. 278 (1936). 
19. /d. at 285-87. 
20. For a discussion of these cases, see Ogletree, supra note 15, at 1826. 
21. To ultimately make its case, the state must also verify the confession with corroborative 
evidence. Srr, P.[(., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 489 n.15 (1963); Smith v. Cnited 
States, 348l'.S. 147, 154 (1954); United States v. Calderon, 348 U.S. 160 (1954). However, even 
if the confession is verified, a conviction will still be reversed if the confession was coerced and 
admitted at trial. Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560, 568 (1958) (the rationale is that no one knows 
whether the conviction was based on the corroborating evidence or on the wrongly admitted con-
fession). "A confession is not voluntary simply because it is the product of sentiment choice. Con-
duct under duress involves a choice, and conduct . . not leaving a free exercise of choice is the 
product of duress as much so as choice reflecting physical constraint." !d. (quoting Union Pac. 
R.R. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 248 U.S. 67, 70 (1918)). The choice must be a "voluntary product 
of a free and unconstrained will." Haynes v. Washington, 373 U.S. 503, 514 (1963). The assess-
ment of voluntariness requires "more than a mere color-matching of cases." Reck v. Pate, 367 
U.S. 433, 442 ( 1961 ). The "question . . is whether the defendant's will was overborne at the 
time that he confessed, [and] if so, the confession cannot be deemed the product of rational intellect 
and free will." Lynumn v. Illinois, 372 U.S. 528 (1963). The test of admissibility of a confession 
was whether "'the confession was made freely, voluntarily, and without compulsion or inducement 
of any sort." Haynr.1, 373 U.S. at 513 (citing Wilson v. United States, 162 U.S. 613, 623 (1896)) 
(emphasis added). This determination must look to the totality of circumstances as well as to the 
established significance of each individual circumstance. Srr United States v. Yeager, 336 F. Supp. 
1287 (1971). 
22. Srr generally Ogletree, 1upra note 15, at 1833-44. 
23. Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964) (limiting the use of incriminating state-
ments made by an indicted person); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964) (extending the sixth 
amendment right to counsel to pre-indictment stage). 
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stand, a general preference for the accusatorial rather than the inquisi-
torial system of justice, the need to deter improper police and state 
practices, and the necessity of balancing the rights of the individual 
against the powers of the state. 24 The basic rationale for the sixth 
amendment approach remained the questionable credibility of coerced 
confessions. 211 
4. The bright line Miranda rule 
The sixth amendment approach, which recognized that custodial 
interrogations can be coercive without an attorney present, set the stage 
for the landmark case Miranda v. Arizona. 26 In the Miranda analysis, 
which focused on the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion rather than due process, the Court declared that a defendant's con-
stitutional rights are violated if his conviction is based, in whole or in 
part, on an involuntary confession, regardless of its truth or falsity, 
even if there is ample evidence aside from confession to support convic-
tion.27 The policy focus expressly shifted from the intrinsic risk of un-
truthfulness of involuntarily made statements to the inherently coercive 
nature of in-custody interrogations by the police28 and the helplessness 
of suspects under such circumstances.29 The Court hoped to get beyond 
the need for case-by-case judicial examination of voluntariness by lay-
ing a bright line rule for admissibility. 30 
To eliminate the burdensome need for case-by-case judicial inter-
vention, Miranda laid down a bright line minimum requirement that 
police officers inform the accused of their right to remain silent and to 
have an attorney. 31 Thus, the Court in A1iranda essentially rejected the 
due process analysis which balanced the accused's due process rights 
against the states' interest in effective law enforcement. As a result of 
Miranda, much of the judicial dialogue regarding the "voluntariness" 
of confessions has shifted to the accused's right to remain silent and 
24. Sn Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'n, 378 U.S. 52 (1964). 
25. The Court noted that it had learned the lesson of history, ancient and modern, that a 
system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on the "confession" will, in the long 
run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic evidence 
independently secured through skillful investigation. Escobedo, 378 U.S. at 488-89. 
26. 384 cs 436 (1966). 
27. !d. 
28. !d. at 455-57,461. This was a reversal of prior cases that held that interrogation alone is 
not so inherentlv coercive, as is physical violence, to render a confession involuntarily and inadmis-
sible. Sn. e.g, Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953). 
29. Sn ,\tmmda, 384 U.S. at 448-55; see also Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S. 387 (1977) 
(Christian burial speech). 
:10. Srt Mimnda, 384 U.S. at 468-69. 
31. Srt• 1(/. at 436. 
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have an attorney in addition to the mere "voluntariness" and/or the 
"totality of circumstances" surrounding custodial interrogation.32 How-
ever, the voluntariness doctrine did not simply disappear. Traditional 
standards of voluntariness continue to apply,33 and merely giving the 
Miranda warning does not automatically render an interrogation non-
coercive. The voluntariness of a confession is still analyzed under the 
"totality of circumstances" test first articulated in 1957.34 Likewise, 
voluntariness remained vital in post Miranda cases, particularly on the 
issue of whether the accused's waiver of right to silence or counsel was 
voluntary. 311 
5. Blurring thP bright linP Miranda rulP 
Since Miranda, the Court has recognized enough exceptions to the 
bright line test that the line is no longer so clear. 36 In 197 4, the Court 
held that Miranda warnings were not constitutional rights in and of 
themselves, but merely prophylactic devices designed to safeguard the 
fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination. 37 This opened the 
door to narrow the application of Miranda and/or to apply a due pro-
cess balancing test rather than the strict bright line rule initially pro-
posed by Miranda. The Court has held that Miranda does not apply 
to custodial statements initiated by the suspect,38 to confessions made by 
suspects who are not in police custody,39 or to interrogation by proba-
tion officials. 40 Otherwise inadmissible confessions may be allowed in 
for impeachment purposes41 or where the confession was obtained 
under circumstances that threaten the public safety. 42 
In the recent case Colorado v. Comully,43 the Court ruled that 
confessions are constitutionally "involuntary" only if coerced by the 
32. Srr, P);., Greenwald v. Wisconsin, 390 U.S. 519 (1968); Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 
315 (1959). 
33. Srr, r.g., Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978). 
34. SN Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957). 
35. Sa, r.g., Davis v. North Carolina, 384 U.S. 737 (1966) (whether defendant advised of 
right to remain silent as required by Miranda is a significant factor in considering voluntariness 
of statements later made). 
36. In response, some have proposed the draconian approach that any and all statements 
obtained by police before a suspect consults with counsel should be automatically inadmissible as 
evidence. SN Ogletree, suprn note 15, at 1842. 
37. Srr Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 433-45 (1974). 
38. Srr Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980). 
39. SPP, r.g., Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492 (1977); Beckwith v. United States, 425 
U.S. 341 (1976). 
40. Srr Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S. 420 (1984). 
41. Ser Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971). 
42. Srr New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 655-58 (1984). 
43. 479 U.S. 157 (1986). 
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government, even if compelled by mental illness. 44 Further, the Court 
stated that the constitutionally based exclusionary rule should only be 
used when it will deter future constitutional violations. 411 Returning to a 
due process analysis, the Court in Connelly held that "coercive police 
activity is a necessary predicate to the finding that a confession is not 
'voluntary' within the meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment. " 46 According to the majority, police coercion has 
been the "crucial element" in confession cases for fifty years.47 There-
fore, the defendant's mental condition alone, although relevant, is not 
dispositive or preclusive of the due process analysis.48 The fifth amend-
ment's sole concern is government coercion, not moral and psychologi-
cal pressures to confess emanating from other sources.49 This view of 
voluntariness is not necessarily inconsistent with Miranda, which ex-
cluded involuntary statements but not volunteered statements.50 The 
Court in Connelly also noted that the most outrageous conduct by a 
private party seeking to secure evidence against a defendant does not 
make that evidence inadmissible; state conduct is the key. 111 The Court 
also held that since due process voluntariness of a confession need only 
be proved by a preponderance of the evidence,112 the minimum standard 
for proving voluntary waiver of Miranda rights should be no higher. 113 
Because all suspects bring their religious convictions and propensi-
ties with them to an interrogation, under Connelly, confessions induced 
by appeal to these attributes will be admissible, assuming there is no 
other form of misconduct or coercion on the part of the state. However, 
the cases that seem most likely to provide a basis for determining such 
an additional form of state misconduct are those involving trickery and 
psychological coercion. 
44. !d. at 164. 
45. !d. ac 157. 
46. ld. at 167. 
47. ld. at 164-65. 
48. !d. 
49. !d. at 170 (quoting Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 305 (1985)). 
50. Srr Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 478 (volunteered statements of any kind not 
barred by the fifth amendment). 
51. Connrlly, 497 U.S. at 165; but Sff Brulay v. United States, 383 F.2d 345, 349 n.S (9th 
Cir. 1967). art. drnird, 389 U.S. 986 (1967) (confessions coerced by private parties not admissi-
ble); Cnited States v. Wolf, 601 F. Supp. 435, 442 n.4 (N.D. Ill. 1 984). In at least one case the 
defendants argued (unsuccessfully) that a minister present during questioning became an agent of 
the state. SN United States v. Brierley, 381 F . .Supp. 447 (M.D. Pa. 1974), di:;cussed infra note 
88. 
52. The state may set higher standards if it chooses. Srr Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477 
( 1972). Some states have opted for a higher standard of proof. S1•r, l'.ff, People v. Jiminez, 21 Cal. 
3d 595, 580 P.2d 672, 147 Cal. Rptr. 172 (1978); State v. Gullick, 118 N.H. o 12, 396 A.2d 554 
(1978); State v. Verhasselt, 83 Wis. 2d 647, 266 N.W.2d 342 (1978). 
53. Connrllr, 497 U.S. at 169-70. 
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6. Trickery and psychological coercion 
Regardless of which standard is employed, the Court has consist-
ently reversed convictions where trickery or deception was employed in 
obtaining the confessions. 114 The Court has long recognized that coer-
cion is not limited to physical force or brutality. Excessive psychological 
influence or "mental ordeal" can also constitute coercion. 1111 "Trickery" 
of any kind will receive considerable scrutiny from the courts. 116 Such 
"trickery" or psychological coercion could include such things as 
lengthy and sustained interrogation,117 threats of third-party violence, 118 
rewards and inducements,119 and the use of trained psychiatrists to ex-
tract a confession through skillful questioning. 60 The doctrinal basis for 
the Court's rejection of confessions obtained under such circumstances 
is virtually always the lack of voluntariness. That is, the ability of the 
accused to freely make the confession is somehow impaired. A confes-
sion, in order to be admissible, must be free and voluntary and cannot 
be the result of any direct or implied promises, however slight, or by 
exerting any improper influence.61 
These holdings raise questions as to whether any promise includes 
something like a promise of salvation and whether an)' improper influ-
ence includes interrogation by a minister or other exploitation of reli-
gious authority. Such "trickery" doctrines seem to provide the best hope 
to defendants for excluding confessions made by appeals to their reli-
gious beliefs. Indeed, in the few cases that have obtained relief on the 
basis of a confession coerced in part by appeal to religious belief, ele-
ments of trickery or coercion were present. 
B. Applying a Voluntariness Standard for Confrssion 
The courts have reached different results on the issue of whether 
an appeal to a suspect's religious beliefs was sufficiently coercive as to 
render the resulting confession involuntary. 62 The conflict began with 
54. Srr, r.g., Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315 (1959) (a police officer who was a friend ol 
the accused misrepresented facts and encouraged a confession). 
55. Sn, r.g., Townsend v. Sa in, 372 U.S. 293 (1963) (exclusion of drug induced confession); 
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 53 (1949); srr also Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967) 
(mental as well as physical coercion). 
56. Sn White, Polia Trickery in Inducing Conjrosions, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 5Hl (1979). 
57. Srr Ashcraft v. Tennessee, 322 U.S. 143 (1944). 
58. Srr Payne v. Arkansas, 356 U.S. 560 (1958). 
59. Srr, r.g., Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884). 
60. Srr Leyra v. Denno, 347 U.S. 556 (1954). 
61. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Shotwell Mfg. Co. v. United States. 371 US. 341 
(1963) 
62. Coerced confessions: Gessner v. United States, 354 F.2d 726 (lOth Cir. 1965); United 
States v. Yeager, 336 F. Supp. 1287 (D.N.J. 1971); srr also Brewer v. Williams. 430 U,.S. 387 
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two decisions rendered one year apart: Gessner v. United States,63 a 
Tenth Circuit case holding that a confession induced in part by appeal 
to the suspect's religious inclinations was coerced,64 and Davis v. North 
Carolina,6~ a Fourth Circuit case holding that appeal to the suspect's 
religious beliefs did not render a confession involuntary.66 
1. Coerced confessions 
In all of the cases where the courts have found confessions induced 
by appeal to religious beliefs involuntary, there have been numerous 
other aggravating circumstances. 
In Gessner,67 the suspect, who was alone, without counsel, and 
mentally ill, was subjected to extended and prolonged questioning by a 
military interrogation team and a military chaplain who was not a 
member of the interrogation team. These interrogators traded off over a 
period of several hours so that the examiner was always fresh. Also, the 
techniques used by these examiners included half-truths and hints of 
lenience. Eventually, the suspect was worn down and upon a religious 
admonishment confessed to the military chaplain and the other interro-
gators. The court found that the suspect's mental condition rendered 
him incapable of making a voluntary confession and that he was essen-
tially tricked into talking with the chaplain when he became too tired to 
resist the questioning. 68 In this case, although the religious appeal was 
an obvious element of the interrogation, there was sufficient coercion 
that even without the use of religious devices the confession would 
probably have been inadmissible. 
In L'nited States v. Yeager, 69 the police committed a host of 
wrongs, including but not limited to, failing to give Miranda warnings, 
intentionally frustrating attempts to reach an attorney, interrogating 
non-stop for ten-and-a-half hours, interrogating in a physically abusive 
manner, performing a strip search, conducting an incommunicado ex-
amination, and preconceiving a scheme to trap the accused that in-
(1977). Voluntary confessions: Welch v. Butler, 835 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1988); Barrera v. Young, 
794 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1986); Stawicki v. Israel, 778 F.2d 380 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. 
Boyce. 594 F.2d 1246 (9th Cir. 1979); Davis v. North Carolina, 339 F.2d 'no (4th Cir. 1964); 
l'nited States v. Brierley, 381 F Supp 447 (M.D. Pa. 1974); \ff al1o Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 
C.S. 493, 498 n.S (1966). 
63. 354 F.2d 726 (10th Cir. 1965). 
64. !d. at 731. 
65. 339 F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1964). 
66. !d. at 776. 
67. 354 F.2d 726 (10th Cir. 1965). 
68. !d. at 731. 
69. 336 F. Supp. 1287 (DNJ 1971). 
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eluded an appeal to his religious beliefs. 70 The court found that the 
circumstances warranted granting habeas corpus relief. 71 Again, the ap-
peal to the suspect's religious beliefs was only one of many coercive 
acts. 
The Supreme Court case that most closely touches upon the issue 
of appeal to religious beliefs is the famous "Christian burial speech" 
case, Brewer v. Williams. 72 The suspect in Brewer was a man known 
by the police to have "quixotic religious convictions" and a history of 
mental disorders. 73 The police had agreed not to interrogate the suspect 
while transporting him because he had not yet spoken with his attor-
ney. However, during the drive, which lasted several hours, one of the 
police officers gave what is known as the "Christian burial speech." 
The officer addressed the suspect as a "reverend" and spoke at length 
about a variety of subjects including religion. As part of the dialogue, 
the officer lamented about how snow would soon conceal the body of 
the victim and prevent a Christian burial. He made an emotional ap-
peal to the suspect to show them where the body was hidden. The sus-
pect then told the police where the victim's body was located. The 
Court relied on a sixth amendment right to counsel analysis to affirm a 
writ of habeas corpus. 74 The Court found that the entire setting was 
conducive to psychological coercion and that there was no evidence of a 
knowing and voluntary waiver of right to counsel. 75 
In People <J. Adams,76 the California Fifth District Court of Ap-
peals found that coercive police tactics-which included conduct consti-
tuting overwhelming and calculated appeal to the defendant's emotions 
and religious beliefs with particular focus on areas where the defendant 
was vulnerable-rendered the resulting confession inadmissible. In par-
ticular, the police focused on the defendant's fear of being placed in a 
mental institution because of mental illness caused by guilt. The de-
fendant, who was suspected of shooting her live-in boyfriend, was in-
terrogated by a sheriff who had known her for a number of years. The 
sheriff conducted a lengthy monologue in which he gave Biblical refer-
ence and preached to the defendant about people who became mentally 
70. !d. at 1290-97. 
71. !d. at 1305. 
72. 430 U.S. 387, 392-93 (1977). 
73. /d. at 412 (Powell, J., concurring). 
7 4. /d. at 401-06. 
75. !d. The voluntariness of the confession itself was not at issue in Brn.J.'fr. The Court 
found that the sixth amendment right to counsel had already "atta!'hed" and that as a result, any 
interrogation without counsel present, even a non-coercive one, would violate the Constitution. 
This right to counsel may be waived, however, and the Court's dis!'ussion regarding voluntariness 
in Brru•n pertained to the voluntariness or lack of voluntariness of such a waiver. Sn id. 
76. 143 Cal. App. 3d 970, 983-84, 192 Cal. Rptr. 290, 298 (1983). 
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ill as a result of the "sin factor" arising from guilt over adulterous 
relationships. The court found that the "cumulative effect" of the sher-
iff's reliance on his friendship with the defendant, his knowledge and 
use of her religious beliefs, and his suggestion that she may end up 
insane and in a mental institution if she did not tell the truth rendered 
the confession involuntary. 77 While other courts have recognized that 
an appeal to religious beliefs may be coercive, they have not always 
held that such an appeal should render the suspect's confession 
inadmissible.78 
2. Voluntary confessions 
Constitutional challenges to confessions induced by appeal to the 
religious beliefs of the accused are relatively recent. This is probably 
because appeal to religious beliefs has historically been regarded as not 
only acceptable, but desirable. 79 One court recently relied on the fact 
that there was no appeal to religion to induce a confession by a minor 
to find that the confession was voluntary. 80 However, the trend is for 
the courts to regard appeals to the suspect's religious convictions a nor-
mal, non-coercive, and in some respects, unavoidable element of custo-
dial interrogation. 
In one of the earliest cases to raise the issue, Davis v. 1\'orth Caro-
lina,81 the Fourth Circuit observed that "[r]eligious influence and reli-
gious exhortation preceding a confession have been thought not only 
unobjectionable but indicative of the trustworthiness of the confes-
sion. " 82 In this case, the suspect and a police officer prayed vocally 
together. It was the next day that the suspect, having been moved by 
the prayer, came forward and confessed. In holding that the confession 
was voluntary, the court relied on Wigmore's assessment of English 
77. !d. 
78. Srr Arizona v. Adams, 145 Ariz. 566, 571,703 P.2d 510, 515 (Ct. App. 1985) (religious 
exhortations can reach the point of being intimidating and coercive, making confessions inadmissi-
ble, but did not do so in this case). This is generally consistent with Arizona courts' previous 
recognition that confessions in response to an appeal to religious or moral sentiment are not neces-
sarily inadmissible. SPP Roman v. State, 23 Ariz. 67, 78-79, 201 P. 551, 554-55 ( 1921) (statement 
that telling the truth would save innocent men from accusation was an appeal to conscience and 
not coercive). 
79. Sn, P.f;., United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 40-41 (1951). 
80. Srr Wilson v. Zimmerman, No. 85-1614 (E.D. Pa. August 21, 1986). 
81. 339 F.2d 770 (4th Cir. 1964 ). 
82. Jrf. at 776 (citing 3 WIGMORE ON EVIDENCE § 840 (3d ed. 1940)). This seems inconsis-
tent with modern rules of evidence which prohibit admitting evidence of beliefs or opinions of a 
witness on matters of religion for the purpose of showing that by reason of their nature the wit-
ness' credibility is impaired or enhanced. FED. R. Evm. 610. This prohibition does not extend to 
inquiry for the purpose of showing bias or interest. FED. R. Evm. 610 advisory committee's note. 
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common law (which is doctrinally-based upon the reliability of the con-
fession, not its voluntariness)83 that "religious exhortations ha[ d] never 
been regarded as vitiating a confession."84 
One year after the first indication that appeal to religion as part of 
custodial interrogation may be problematic,811 the Supreme 
Court-which has never specifically addressed the issue of confessions 
induced by resort to the religious beliefs of the accused-indirectly ad-
dressed (in dicta) the significance of an accused's religious beliefs and 
hinted that there may not be a constitutional bar to such tactics. 86 In a 
lengthy footnote discussing the fifth amendment right against self-in-
crimination and certain parallels in Jewish Talmudic law, the Court 
reiterated that the constitutional doctrine on self-incrimination is con-
cerned only with forced confessions (usually through torture), and im-
plied that appeal to the religious beliefs of a suspect would not consti-
tute such force. 87 
In United States v. Brierley,88 the suspect, at his own request, was 
allowed to speak with his minister.89 Shortly thereafter, apparently in 
the presence of the minister and the police, he spontaneously confessed. 
The suspect later challenged the confession on the grounds that the 
minister was an agent of the state. The minister would not disclose the 
details of their conversation. The court found that the presence of the 
minister actually served to make the interrogation less coercive and held 
that the confession was voluntary. 90 
In United States I'. Boyce,91 the petitioner claimed his confession 
was involuntary on the grounds that FBI agents used psychological 
pressure to get him to waive his right to silence. The petitioner argued 
that the FBI agents' appeals to his loyalty to his country and family 
were analogous to the famous "Christian burial speech" case, Brewer 
v. Williams. 92 The court found no similarity between the cases and 
held that the confession was voluntary. The court reasoned that, unlike 
the suspect in the "Christian burial speech" case, Boyce was intelligent 
and answered questions selectively, exercising his right to silence when 
83. Sn supra note 9 and accompanying text. 
84. !d. 
85. SPP supra note 67 and accompanying text. 
86. Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967). 
87. Sn id. at 497 n.5. 
88. 381 F. Supp. 447, 458 (MD. Pa. 1974). 
89. Sfr also United States v. Carignan, 342 U.S. 36, 42-43 (1951) (confession made after 
conferring with priest called at defendant's request was not coerced). 
90. Brinlfy, 381 F. Supp. at 459-60, 471. 
91 594 F.2d 1246 (9th Cir. 1979). 
92. 430 U.S. 387 ( 1977), discussed supra at note 72 and accompanying text. 
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he wanted. 93 Further, Boyce was a fifth amendment right to silence 
case, not a right to counsel case like Brewer.94 
Six years later the "Christian burial speech" defense was unsuc-
cessfully attempted again in Stawicki v. lsraef.9~'> In this case, the sus-
pect had neither the mental incapacity nor the "quixotic religious incli-
nations" of the suspect in Brewer.96 Rather, he was highly intelligent 
and thought the police officer's religious beliefs were "stupid."97 The 
court found that appeals to religious belief alone do not automatically 
render a confession or a waiver of Miranda rights involuntary and that 
other circumstances surrounding the confession or waiver must be con-
sidered. 98 In this case, the arrest was legal and the suspect was advised 
of his Miranda rights. That, combined with the intellectual abilities 
and religious disposition of the suspect, led the court to find that the 
suspect's will was not overcome.99 
According to the Seventh Circuit, even if the suspect had sympa-
thized with the religious appeal and had not believed the police officer's 
religious beliefs were "stupid," the confession may still have been vol-
untary.100 In Barrera 11. Young/ 01 the court focused on the suspect's 
knowing, voluntary, and willful submission to skilled examination. The 
suspect had voluntarily submitted to a polygraph examination, he was 
psychologically prepared for the examination, and his lawyer was read-
ily available. During the questioning, the examiner appealed to the sus-
pect's religious beliefs and truthfully told him that a codefendant had 
implicated him in the crime.102 The petitioner claimed the discussion of 
religion tipped the balance because "that's my weak spot ... because I 
really love God." 103 
In holding that the confession was admissible as evidence, the 
court reasoned that only pointed and unexpected questions by a poly-
graph examiner will generate the physiological changes that the poly-
93. BoyCI', 594 F.2d at 1251. 
94. 430 U.S 387 (1977); .w also Boyer, 594 F.2d at 1249. 
95. 778 F.2d 380 i7th Cir. 1985). 
96. /d. at 382-83. 
97. /d. at 383. 
98. /d. 
99. /d. at 383-84. 
100. lr!. 
101. 794 F.2d 1264 (7th Cir. 1986). 
102. The petitioner also claimed the confession was involuntary on the grounds that the 
questioner told him he had been implicated by someone else. The court held that the questioner 
may accurately reveal other evidence in his possession, including implication by someone else. The 
truth may make a confession more likely, but it does this by enabling the suspect to make an 
informed choice, not by overbearing the will. !d. at 1270. 
103. /d. 
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graph records. 104 According to the court, "[i]t is difficult to describe an 
appeal to religious beliefs as unacceptable in our society; such appeals 
are common parts of [everyday] life and need not cease at the door of 
the jail." 10~> The suspect could have cut off the appeal to religion or 
called for his attorney but instead found the appeal "compelling."106 
The court in Barrera did not consider that there are many other 
"common parts of everyday life" that must cease at the door of the jail 
because they are in fact coercive. The foundation of the Supreme 
Court's "trickery" holdings, for example, is that even if deception and 
cunning are a part of common everyday experience, when these devices 
are exploited by the state to induce confessions, the confessions are not 
voluntary. 107 The holding in Connelly makes it clear that the key is not 
how ordinary the compulsion is, but whether or not it is proper for the 
state or agents of the state to employ it. 108 The use of appeals to reli-
gion cannot be justified simply because they are "ordinary." If religious 
appeals are justifiable at all, it must be on some other basis. 
In the most recent case on this issue, Welch ·u. Butlrr, 109 the Fifth 
Circuit found such an alternative basis for justifying appeals to the sus-
pect's religious beliefs by defining the coercion as being strictly reli-
gious, not secular, and therefore not something that was or could have 
been improperly employed by the state. The court in Welch found that 
the use of a murder suspect's religious beliefs with respect to salvation 
was not employed by police to coerce a confession in violation of fifth 
and fourteenth amendment due process rights. At most, the police set 
up a situation that allowed the suspect to focus for some time on his 
concern for salvation and divine forgiveness in hope that his desire to be 
saved would lead him to confess.no 
According to the court in WPlch, the voluntariness standard is not 
satisfied by the suspect's voluntarily yielding to the "will of God," but 
rather by the suspect's confession being "voluntary" within the mean-
ing of the due process clauses. 111 Voluntariness in the constitutional 
sense is ultimately a legal question. To be voluntary, the person must 
make an independent and informed choice of his own free will, possess-
ing the capability to do so, his will not being overborne by the pressures 
104. !d. at 1270. 
105. !d. 
106. !d. Apparently, even though the appeal to religious belief was "compelling," the result-
ing confession was not coerced but voluntary. 
107. Srr suJna note 43 and accompanying text. 
108. Srr supra note 46 and accompanying text. 
109. 835 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1988). 
110. Irl. at 95. 
Ill. !d. 
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and circumstances swirling around him. The petitioner's concern with 
salvation existed prior to his conversations with the police. "What coer-
cion existed was sacred, not profane. " 112 
In one sense, the fact that the petitioner's concern with salvation 
existed prior to his interrogation brings Welch closer to the Connelly 
doctrine, which states that it is the coercive acts of the state which are 
dispositive rather than the pre-existing conditions of the suspect. 113 
However, in another sense, the holding in Welch ignores the great sig-
nificance of the state's affirmative role in coercion and disregards the 
real significance of an individual's particular susceptibility to religious 
coercion. Although under Connell)' it is the state's actions, not external 
influences, that render a confession either voluntary or coerced, the 
state still takes its suspects as it finds them. For example, ordinarily a 
hand shake is a normal and non-coercive part of everyday life. How-
ever, if a suspect suffers from a severe arthritic condition, this same 
hand shake could have a very coercive effect. Similarly, an individual's 
mt:ntal and/or emotional susceptibility to the coercive effects of an ap-
peal to religion should certainly be a factor to consider. 114 
Perhaps an even more fundamental issue alluded to by the Court 
in Cowzell) is the significance of the state's exploitation of religion 
under the religion clauses.U 5 None of the cases discussed deal with 
these issues. The results of these cases, which reject the argument that 
confessions derived from appeal to religious belief are inadmissible, are 
probably correct for the reasons to be discussed in the next section. 
However, the judiciary's analysis, in terms of the significance of the 
coercive effect of appeals to religious belief and the propriety of such 
action by a state, is incomplete and superficial. 
3. Distinguishing doctrine and circumstances 
The fact that the courts have reached different results in cases that 
deal with the issue of appeals to a suspect's religious beliefs is not par-
112. !d .. \er a/.,o .~tate v. Roman, 23 Ariz. 67. 78-79, 201 P. S51, 5S4-S5 (1921) (appeal to 
conscience or religious sentiment is an inducement that is not of a temporal or worldly nature). 
The mncept of distinguishing between religious coercion and secular coercion raises a question as 
to whether the establishment clause was violated by an agent of the state exploiting religion for 
state interest>. For the court to define what is or is not religious by declaring that one form of 
coercion is sacred and another is not may also impinge upon the free exercise right of people to set 
their own parameters as to what religion is or is not. 
113 . . ~re '"fn(l note 46 and accompanying text. 
11 ·\. SN Brewer v. Williams, 430 U.S . .187 (1977), discussed wpm not<' 72 and accompany· 
ing text. This ca'e was decided on sixth amendment right to counsel grounds. However, the sus-
pet!·, individual susceptibility to the coercive nature of the "Christian burial" speech was of great 
cont ern tn the Court. 
115. Stl' 111jm section Ill-C. 
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ticularly meaningful, except to show that appeals to religious belief 
alone make little if any doctrinal difference. Since the very first two 
cases to consider this issue, the courts have relied on a totality of cir-
cumstances rationale. The appeals of a state to a suspect's religious be-
liefs have not been the deciding factors, but have merely been one part 
of the totality. In Gessner v. United States, 116 the suspect's confession 
was coerced because, in addition to the fact that coercive techniques 
were employed, the suspect was insane and did not have the capacity to 
make a voluntary confession in any event. In Davis v. North Caro-
lina,117 the confession was voluntary because the suspect had counsel 
and had at least a day, away from any pressure of the interrogation, to 
consider confessing. 
Since the doctrinal basis of the holding in the "Christian burial 
speech" case, Brewer, is the sixth amendment right to counsel, it is not 
at all dispositive on the issue of the significance, if any, of the police 
officer's appeal to the suspect's religion in and of itself. The appeal was 
as much based on the emotion of the situation as on the suspect's reli-
gion.118 The result would have been the same even without an appeal 
to religion. 
The cases in which a confession has been held to be involuntary 
have included "something more", or other elements of psychological co-
ercion besides appeals to religion, that put them closer to the trickery 
cases. That "something more" has included mental illness of the sus-
pect,119 half-truths and hints of lenience/20 extended and prolonged in-
terrogations/21 failure to give Miranda warnings/22 an incommuni-
cado examination and/or intentional frustration of attempts to reach an 
attorney, 123 and a physically abusive and naked examination.124 In 
most instances, appeals to religious belief and other potentially coercive 
acts were cumulative and part of a preconceived scheme or plan to trap 
the accused. 1211 The argument and holding in Connelly also indicate 
that whether appeal to religion is regarded as coercive is not only just 
external appeal to religious belief but also the government's role in ex-
ploiting the religious beliefs of the suspect. 126 In other words, the 
116. 354 F.2d 726 (lOth Cir. 1965). 
117. 339 F.2d 770,776 (4th Cir. 1964). 
118. 5ff BrPwn, 430 U.S. 387 (1977). 
119. 5n id. at 390; Gessner v. United States, 354 F.2d 726, 729 (lOth Cir. 1965). 
120. GPsmPr, 354 F.2d at 731. 
121. ld. 5ff also United States v. Yeager, 336 F. Supp. 1287, 1303 (D.N.J 1971). 
122. 51'1' id. 
123. !d.; Bri'U'n, 430 U.S. at 398-99. 
124. Yragpr, 336 F. Supp. at 1203. 
125. ld.; People v. Adams, 143 Cal. App. 3d 970, 988-99, 192 Cal. Rptr. 290, 302 (1983). 
126. 51'1' Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164-65 (1986); Oregon v. Elstead, 470 U.S. 
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"something more" must come from or be a result of police conduct or 
state action, not private action. 
III. FIRST AMENDMENT AND OTHER CoNSTITUTIONAL BARRIERS 
To ADMISSIBLE CoNFESSIONs 
In addition to the arguments based on fifth and fourteenth amend-
ment right to counsel, right to silence, and due process that were raised 
in the cases discussed above, certain other constitutional principles have 
the potential to become significant on the issue of whether or not a state 
can use religion to advance its own purposes. 
A. Privacy 
Presumably, before the police can make an effective appeal based 
upon a suspect's religious beliefs, they must know what those beliefs 
are. Of course, the police may make presumptions as to the suspect's 
religious inclinations and may obtain an admissible confession, even if 
their presumption was mistaken. 127 Nevertheless, it is at least theoreti-
cally possible that a constitutional right to privacy would bar or limit 
police presumption about or inquiry into a person's religious beliefs 
and thereby frustrate appeals to religion as a means of inducing confes-
sions. Because the right of privacy is only implicit within the Constitu-
tion, its scope and application is subject to even greater debate and con-
fusion than express rights. However, what little court action the right 
of privacy has had in the area of appealing to religious beliefs to induce 
confession indicates that the scope of the right will probably not extend 
to such practices. 
In Ramie v. City of Hedwig Village, 128 the plaintiff alleged that 
police investigation and inquiry into her gender, religious beliefs, and 
lifestyle violated her constitutional right to privacy. 129 Ramie, a female 
who suffered from a congenital condition giving her certain male char-
acteristics, found the inquiry offensive. The court, however, found no 
evidence to support claims that her constitutional right to privacy was 
violated. 130 Preventing police inquiry into religious beliefs would prob-
ably be better accomplished, if at all, under first amendment doctrine. 
298, 305 (1985). 
127. Sn Stawicki v. Israel, 778 F.2d 380, 383 (7th Cir. 1985 ). Under the voluntariness 
doctrine used by the court, the confession was admissible not only in spite of the fact that the 
police were mistaken about the suspect's religious inclinations but also because of the mistaken 
presumption. 
128. 765 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1985). 
129. 1rl. at 493-94. 
130. !d. at 494. 
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B. Freedom of Religion 
Discussion of the first amendment issues raised by exploitation of 
religious beliefs of a suspect is completely absent from the case law on 
the issue. This may be a result of the fact that such confessions have 
not been challenged on the basis of first amendment principles. Never-
theless, doctrinally, a number of significant questions may be raised, 
particularly in light of the current trend of viewing "voluntariness" as 
a function of state coercion rather than private or so-called "sacred" 
coercion. 131 There must be some point at which the state exploitation of 
private or "sacred" coercion becomes impermissible. This point may or 
may not be clearly ascertainable from doctrines of "voluntariness" 
alone. The point at which many instances of state exploitation of pri-
vate coercion become impermissible probably lies at the intersection of 
"voluntariness" and other constitutionally protected rights such as reli-
gious freedom. Religious freedom may include the right not to be inter-
rogated with questions concerning religion. A recognized policy concern 
behind the protection against self-incrimination is the first amendment 
rationale that the privilege affords "a shelter against government snoop-
ing and oppression concerning political and religious beliefs." 132 
C. Free Exercise Clause 
Where does the point of intersection between voluntariness and 
religious freedom lie? Would it be a violation of the free exercise clause 
to prohibit law enforcement personnel from advocating their own ear-
nestly held religious belief that God mandated confession of certain 
acts? Would it be a violation of the free exercise clause to prohibit the 
accused from exercising his religious belief that confession was essential 
to salvation? What about allowing the accused to counsel with clergy to 
determine the appropriateness of confession? Would the use of clergy 
be the acts of private parties or could the clergy become an agent of the 
state ?133 Even if the state must allow its police officers to advocate con-
fession under the free exercise clause, is it still better to exclude the 
evidence of the confession because it is involuntary? Does the exploita-
131 Sff Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 164-65 (1986) (state coercion prohibited, but 
private coercion not prohibited); Welch v. Butler, 835 F.2d 92, 95 (5th Cir. 1988) ("sacred" 
coercion not prohibited). 
132. Friendly, Tht Fifth Amnzdmnll Tomorrou•: Tht Ca.1f for Comtitutional Changt, 37 
U. CIN. L. REV. 679, 696 (1968). The Court has implicitly recognized that the first amendment is 
the appropriate vehicle for dealing with the problem of state intrusion into political and religious 
beliefs through coerced confessions. Sn NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958). 
133. United States v. Brierley, 381 F. Supp. 447, 459-60, 471 (M.D. Pa. 1974) (clergy was 
not an agent of the state but served to make the confession even more voluntary and reliable). 
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tion of religion by the police pose any establishment clause problem? 
For instance, would such exploitation be an example of state funds and 
resources being used to further private religious beliefs and interests? 
What about instances where the police actually employ religious mater-
ials or symbols such as Bibles or crosses? Does the fact that the police 
officer and the accused share the same religious beliefs alter the analy-
sis ?134 Is the state paying police to be evangelical advocates of the reli-
gious necessity of confession? Is there a de facto state religion based 
upon the tenet that confession is good for the soul? 
Free exercise clause limits on the state exploitation of religious 
beliefs will occur, if at all, if the government intrusion into and ex-
ploitation of religion has the effect of "chilling" free exercise of religion 
by creating incentives for some activities and disincentives for others. 135 
Potential establishment clause limits on the state adoption of religion to 
achieve its purposes would be analyzed under the Lemon test, particu-
larly the "secular purpose" and "excessive entanglement" forks of the 
Lemon test. 136 These issues also raise important questions about the 
tension and balance between the religion clauses and the significance of 
what is meant, constitutionally, by the term "religion." 
These issues concerning the potential constitutional limits on the 
exploitation of religion in state efforts to extract criminal confessions 
merit detailed analysis, at least for the sake of doctrinal continuity. Ab-
sent excessive abuse of religion by the state and the resulting considera-
tion of these issues by the courts, this doctrinal dialogue may remain in 
the province of law journals and academic theorizing. The purpose for 
raising the first amendment issues here is not to provide an exhaustive 
examination of the topic, but rather to pose certain questions and theo-
retical possibilities in order to explore and perhaps expand the horizon 
of "voluntariness" analysis. 
IV. CoNCLUSION 
Appeal to religious beliefs may be one element of the total circum-
stances that render a confession constitutionally involuntary. However, 
appeal to religion alone will not vitiate a confession. There must be 
something more. This "something more" could be any one of the many 
things that would otherwise render a confession not "voluntary" even 
without appeal to religious beliefs-trickery, deception, mental incapac-
134. Srr Mikulovski v. State, 54 Wis. 2d 699, 715, 196 N .W.2d 748, 7 56 ( 1972) (since the 
defendant and the examining detective were of the same religious belief, praying together did not 
constitute psychological coercion). 
135. Srr, r.g., Corporation of the Presiding Bishop v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 335 (1987). 
136. Srr, r.g., Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971). 
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ity of the suspect, prolonged and/or physically abusive interrogation, or 
absence of counsel. At least theoretically, the "something more" may 
also be the violation of other constitutionally protected rights. 
